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Secure Implementation in Production Economies
Rajnish Kumary
August 11, 2013
Abstract
This paper shows that, in production economies, the generalized serial social choice functions dened by [Shenker [23]]
are securely implementable (in the sense of [Saijo et al. [22]]) and that they include the well-known xed path social choice
functions.
Keywords: Secure implementation, double implementation, serial social choice function, xed path methods
1 Introduction
Secure implementation [Saijo et al. [22]] requires double implementation in dominant strategy equilibrium and Nash equi-
librium by the same mechanism. Experimental testing [Cason et al. [3]] has shown that this concept works better than
the traditional implementation concepts like implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and implementation in Nash
equilibria. Since secure implementation is stronger than both of the concepts of implementation mentioned above, negative
(impossibility) results abound in various environments with richer domains. Various examples of such environments are
provided in [Saijo et al. [22]]. More recent negative results include Bochet and Sakai [1], and Fujinaka and Wakayama [9].
We look for secure implementability in production economies with divisible goods. In contrast to the negative results in
various environments, we nd that a very broad generalization of "serial" social choice function (SCF) [Moulin and Shenker
[19]] as dened in [Shenker [23]] is securely implementable. We call such functions generalized serial SCFs (GSS). We also nd
that under certain mild conditions the xed path SCFs are special cases of GSS and thus they are also securely implementable.
The intuition behind the idea that the serial SCF (or more generally the GSS) possesses the nice incentive property of
secure implementability whereas, as we will discuss later, the SCF corresponding to other well-known cost sharing rules like
the Aumann-Shapley rule (which is the proportional rule in homogeneous goods case) does not share this feature1 is the
following. In the latter, by changing the report, an agent can a¤ect the outcome for all agents simultaneously. In particular,
that agents report changes the outcomes of such agents whose reports in turn, can change his outcome. This severe nature of
externality in such SCF violates the acyclicity condition necessary for the combination of non-bossiness and strategyproofness
(see, Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein [25] ) of the SCF which in turn is necessary for secure implementability (Proposition
2 in Saijo et al. [22]). Under the serial SCF, on the contrary, protecting lower demanders2 from the demands of higher
demanders makes the externality one-sided and thus not so severe. More precisely, a change in the report of low demanders
changes the outcomes for all high demanders whereas a small change in the report of high demanders doesnt a¤ect the
outcome for lower demanders.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In section 2 we introduce the precise notion of secure implementability
and state one proposition that characterizes the securely implementable SCFs. In section 3 we dene the serial cost sharing
method and introduce some generalizations considered in the literature, with a special focus on the cost sharing methods
whose strategic properties have been studied. In section 4 we dene serial SCF and GSS, in section 5 we present two of our
main results, and in section 6 we conclude the paper with a conjecture. The main proofs are gathered in Appendix A.
I would like to thank my advisor Herve Moulin for his continuous guidance. I also thank Simon Grant, Dipjyoti Mazumdar, Manipushpak
Mitra, Anirban Kar, Justin Leroux, and Gaurab Aryal for their critical comments. Detailed comments of two referees and the associate editor have
been instrumental in shaping this version.
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1The SCF corresponding to the Aumann-Shapley rule is not even strategyproof
2By low demander in homogeneous case we mean an agent who gets smaller share of the output and pays lower level of input as the nal
outcome of the SCF. In heterogeneous case, di¤erent generalizations of serial mechanism rank the agents in orders based on di¤erent criteria.
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2 Secure implementability
We consider an arbitrary set of alternatives A and a nite set of agents N = f1; 2; :::; ng , where n  2. Typical agents are
represented by letters i; j etc. The preference relation of agent i over the set A is represented by utility function ui. The
set of admissible utility functions for agent i is denoted by Ui. The cartesian product of U1; U2; ::::; Un is represented by U ,
i.e., U  
i2N
Ui. A typical element of U is a utility prole u = (u1; ::::un), which is an n tuple of utility functions one for
each agent. A social choice function (SCF) f : U ! A is a function that associates every u 2 U with a unique alternative
f(u) in A. A mechanism (or a game form) g : S ! A is a function that assigns to every s 2 S a unique element of A, where
S  
i2N
Si and Si is the strategy space of agent i.
Denition 1 The mechanism g is called a direct revelation mechanism associated with the SCF f if Si = Ui for all i 2 N
and g(u) = f(u) for all u 2 U .
Sometimes we may refer to a direct revelation mechanism as the SCF if no confusion arises. When the strategies of agents
j 6= i are xed at s i  (s1; s2; ::; si 1; si+1; :::; sn), agent i can induce certain outcomes by choosing strategies from the set
Si. The set of such outcomes denoted by g(Si; s i) is called the attainable set or the opportunity set of agent i at s i. More
formally, g(Si; s i)  fb 2 Aj9si 2 Si; and g(si; s i) = bg. The set of alternatives that agent i with utility ui ranks weakly
below the alternative a 2 A is called the weak lower contour set for agent i with utility ui at a and is denoted by L(a; ui).
More formally, L(a; ui)  fb 2 Ajui(a)  ui(b)g. Given the mechanism g : S ! A, the strategy prole s 2 S is a Nash
equilibrium (NE) of g at u 2 U if 8i 2 N , g(Si; s i)  L(g(s); ui). Lets denote by Ng(u) the set of Nash equilibria of g at
u.
Denition 2 The mechanism g implements SCF f in Nash equilibria if for all u 2 U , (i) 9 s 2 Ng(u) st. g(s) = f(u) and
(ii) 8s 2 Ng(u); g(s) = f(u).
The SCF f is Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism that implements f in Nash equilibria. Given the mechanism
g : S ! A, the strategy prole s 2 S is a dominant strategy equilibrium of g at u 2 U if 8i 2 N ,8~s i 2 S i, g(Si; ~s i) 
L(g(si; ~s i); ui). Lets denote by DSg(u) the set of dominant strategy equilibria of g at u.
Denition 3 The mechanism g implements f in dominant strategy equilibria if for all u 2 U , (i) 9 s 2 DSg(u) st.
g(s) = f(u) and (ii) 8s 2 DSg(u); g(s) = f(u).
The SCF f is dominant strategy implementable if there exists a mechanism that implements f in dominant strategy
equilibria. We now introduce formally the concept of secure implementation, which requires the existence of a mechanism
that implements the SCF in Nash equilibria as well as in dominant strategy equilibria.
Denition 4 The mechanism g securely implements the SCF f if for all u 2 U , (i) 9 s 2 DSg(u) st. g(s) = f(u) and (ii)
8s 2 Ng(u); g(s) = f(u).
The SCF f is securely implementable (SI) if there exists a mechanism that securely implements f . Strategyproofness is
a requirement on an SCF that truth telling by the agents is a dominant strategy under the direct revelation mechanism.
More formally, the SCF f satises strategy proofness (SP) if, 8u 2 U;8i 2 N;8eui 2 Ui;ui(f(u)) > ui(f(~ui; u i)). Another
technical property on the SCF, introduced in Saijo et. al. [22], which together with strategyproofness characterizes secure
implementability, is called the rectangularity property and is dened as following. The SCF f satises the rectangularity prop-
erty (RP) if for all u; ~u 2 U; if ui(f(~ui; ~u i)) = ui(f(ui; ~u i)) for all i 2 N;then f(~u) = f(u): The following characterization
due to Saijo et al. [22] will be used in one of our main results.
Proposition 1 (Saijo et. al. [22]): An SCF f is securely implementable if and only if f satises the SP and the RP.
3 Serial cost sharing methods
Serial cost sharing method (Moulin and Shenker [19]) was rst introduced for an environment where the goods demanded by
the agents are homogeneous or, in other words, the agents demand various quantities of the same good. Since our purpose
here is to extend this method to more general settings, we will dene the problem in an environment where each agent i 2 N
demands qi 2 [0; qmax]  R+[f1g quantity3 of a personalized4 good i. Thus qi, the ith component of vector q 2 RN+ , can be
thought of as the demand for good i as well as the demand of agent i. The cost of serving these demands is C(q), which must
3qmax can be 1.
4 In some of the more general models, e.g., [11], [12], each agent may demand quantities of some or all of the goods.
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be divided among the agents; the cost share of agent i is given by xi(q;C). The preference of agent i is dened over R2; which
is continuous, increasing in qi, decreasing in xi and the upper contour set is convex5 . Let a concave utility function ui(qi; xi)
represent the preference of agent i. For the homogeneous goods case, a homogeneous cost function is dened as following (see,
e.g., [24]). A cost function C is homogeneous if there exists c0 : R+ ! R+ such that C(q) = c0(qN ) where, qN =
P
i2N qi.
Here the serial cost sharing method is dened as follows. Consider, without loss of generality, q1  q2  ::::  qn. Dene,
qi = (q1; q2; :::; qi 1; qi; qi; :::; qi) then ,
xi(q;C) =
C(qi)
n+ 1  i  
i 1X
k=1
C(qk)
(n+ 1  k)(n  k) (1)
This method works as follows. Agent 1, with the lowest demand q1 pays 1=nth of the cost of nq1. Agent 2, with the second
lowest demand pays agent 1s cost share, plus 1=(n 1)th of the incremental cost from nq1 to q1+(n 1)q2. Agent 3, with the
next lowest demand pays agent 2s cost share, plus 1=(n 2)th of the incremental cost from q1+(n 1)q2 to q1+q2+(n 2)q3.
And so on. This method is characterized by "anonymity" and "invariance of the cost share of low demanders by a change
in the demand of high demanders." The demand game generated by this method is as follows. Each agent has a strategy
(demand) space which is R+ and his cost share as a function of the demand prole is computed by (1). The payo¤ is given
by the utility function dened above. It should be noted that the serial cost sharing method (1) is dened for any arbitrary
cost function. However, if we assume the cost function to be strictly6 convex (increasing marginal costs), then this demand
game has very strong strategic properties. In this demand game the NE is unique, robust to coalitional deviations and the
only rationalizable strategy prole. Moreover, this NE is the unique outcome of adaptive learning (Milgrom and Roberts,
[16] ).
Given the nice strategic and equity properties that the serial method enjoys in the homogeneous good setting, it is natural
to look for the extension of the rule in more general settings. Friedman [5] studies the strategic properties of a class of such
methods, which we describe in the next paragraph, and nds that these do enjoy nice strategic properties similar to serial cost
sharing in the homogeneous goods case. He nds out the game induced by such methods is solvable by iterative elimination
of overwhelmed strategies7 introduced in Friedman & Shenker [8].8
The natural extension of the serial method (1) to the heterogeneous case, where C(q) is an arbitrary non-decreasing and
continuously di¤erentiable function of its n variables, which was introduced in Friedman and Moulin [7], is dened as follows.9
Consider a path10 SC from 0 to q given by SC(t; q) = (te)^ q; for t  0; where (p^ q)i = minfpi; qig and e = (1; 1; :::; 1) is
the unit vector in RN . This path essentially follows the diagonal of the n dimensional positive orthant until its coordinates
are smaller than all the coordinates of the demand vector q. As soon as it meets the demand of some agent, it starts following
the projection of the diagonal in the hyperplane where that coordinate is xed at the demand in that coordinate and so on.
Given such a path SC the cost sharing mechanism is given by,
xSCi (q;C) =
Z 1
0
@iC(
SC(t; q))dSCi (t; q) (2)
Here, @iC(p) is the partial derivative of C with respect to pi evaluated at p: It is clear from (2) that the path relevant to
an agent is independent of higher demands. Thus, the cost shares of agents are una¤ected by small changes in the demands
of higher demanding agents. Therefore, the externality is one sided (and, thus, acyclic). Intuitively, for this reason this
mechanism enjoys nice strategic properties that we will see in Theorem 1. Moreover, for the same reason, the nice strategic
properties are preserved if the SC is replaced by any arbitrary continuous non-decreasing path (t;C)^ q; where  satises
the following properties. For xed C,  is non-decreasing and continuous in t with (0;C) = 0 and limt!1 i(t;C) > q
max
for all i. See gure 1 below for an example of such a .
This liberty of choosing the  gives rise to a huge class of cost sharing methods called xed path methods (FPM). There
is an FPM corresponding to each xed path  that can be dened as follows.
xi (q;C) =
Z 1
0
@iC((t;C) ^ q)d(i(t;C) ^ qi) (3)
The path  that uniquely denes a cost sharing method does not depend on q and thus is xed in a sense. One example of
a xed path is the path which follows the edges of the n orthotope (whose two diagonally opposite vertices are the demand
5An special case which is widely studied in this framework is the preference which is quasilinear in xi and concave in qi:
6 strictness is not needed if the preferences of the agents are strictly convex.
7A strategy si for agent i is overwhelmed by strategy si with respect to S i if the best that agent i can get over S i by playing si is worse than
the worst that he gets by playing si.
8Notice that this is stronger property than solvability in elimination of dominated strategies.
9Note that for the characterizations (e.g., [24], [13]) of the Moulin-Shenker method intorduced in the next paragraph, more restrictions on the
cost function C may be required. For example, [24] requires C to be twice continuously di¤erentiable with bounded derivatives with no xed costs
whereas, [13] also requires C to be strictly increasing, and Lipschitz-continuity and boundedness of its partial derivatives.
10SC in the symbol underlines the point that this path corresponds to the generalization of Serial Cost (SC) sharing rule.
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vector q and the zero vector 0) in some pre-decided order and this leads to the incremental methods. Notice that when the
cost function is symmetric or when  is independent of the cost function then the only symmetric FPM is the Friedman-
Moulin method (2) dened by the path that is the diagonal of the positive orthant. Leroux [15] provides a justication of
non-symmetric paths. However, symmetry is trivially satised when the cost function is not symmetric and we allow  to be
a function of C. This gives rise to a huge class of symmetric methods. Clearly, we will be sacricing additivity in most of the
cases but we can recover scale invariance and even stronger properties like ordinality11 ( see Sprumont [24] ). The path that
most closely follows the spirit of the serial method is the path that denes the Moulin-Shenker ordinal method discussed in
( Sprumont [24] ). This path which we will call MS , is dened by the solution of the following di¤erential equation
dMSi (t;C)=dt = 1=@iC(
MS(t;C))
satisfying the boundary condition MS(0;C) = 0. This path has the property that on any point on the path the incremental
cost generated by a small move along the path is shared equally among the agents not fully served. Other examples of FPMs
can be generated by applying a FPM to any suitably normalized problem e.g. applying FPM to axially normalized problem
( Friedman [5] ). One seemingly natural FPM thus generated discussed in Friedman [5] is the use of diagonal path after axial
normalization of the problem.
Figure 1: Fixed path method in two agent case Figure 2: Serial SCF in two agent case
Given the set of agents N; utility prole u = fuigi2N , and a cost function C, a xed path method x(; ) induces a
cost sharing game  (x; u) . These induced games have a variety of strategic properties: uniqueness of NE, strong equilibria,
uniqueness of the set of rationalizable outcomes, and convergence of adaptive learners. Friedman [5] shows these properties
for xed path methods by showing that the induced games are O-solvable which in turn implies all of these properties.
Theorem 1 (Friedman [5]): Assume that the marginal cost ( @iC(q)) is strictly increasing in all variables, x

i (; ) is a
xed path method and that preferences, ui(qi; xi) are increasing in qi, decreasing in xi; and concave. Then the induced game
is O-solvable.
It should be noted that there can be paths that depend on q and we can use such paths to dene "path methods" in a
similar fashion as in (3). One prominent example of such a path method is the Aumann-Shapley method where the path is
the ray joining the origin to the demand vector; thus for each demand there corresponds a path. More precisely, the path
that generates the Aumann-Shapley method is given by AS(t;C)(q) = tq. We notice that this path is not a xed path
and the demand game generated by this method does not share the appealing strategic properties enjoyed by the FPMs.
The Aumann-Shapley method in the homogeneous goods case is the proportional method. It has been shown in Watts [26]
(see also Moulin [17] for detailed analyses ) that uniqueness of NE is not guaranteed in the proportional demand games for
general convex preferences and a su¢ cient condition has been shown to be the binormality of preferences. Moreover, as we
will discuss in the next section, even when the NE is unique, this method doesnt share the strategic properties of the FPMs.
Intuitively, this happens because a change in the demand by any agent changes the cost shares of all agents. For more on such
path methods and the axiomatic characterization of methods generated by paths and more generally by convex combinations
of paths, please refer to Friedman and Moulin [7].
4 Serial SCF and generalized serial SCF
We mentioned in the last section that if the production technology has increasing marginal costs and preferences are convex,
then the serial rule (1) dened in the homogeneous goods case induces a game that admits a unique NE. A serial social choice
function (SCF) for a xed cost function C associates this unique NE allocation to the preference prole generating this game.
11Ordinality is a stronger requirement than scale invariance. Scale invariance requires that the cost shares should be invariant to linear trans-
formation of the demand prole whereas ordinality requires that it should be invariant to any arbitrary monotonic transformations, possibily non
linear.
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Figure 2 above demonstrates the serial mechanism (SCF) in a two-agent and two-goods economy where one good x is the
input (horizontal axis) and the other good q is output (vertical axis). The production technology is decreasing returns to
scale, i.e., the cost function is convex. The dotted curve is c(q); the dash-dot curve is c(2q)=2; and the solid curve coincides
with the dash-dot one until point A and then goes parallel to dotted curve. More precisely, the solid curve has two parts.
The part below point A is the locus of points that are 1=2 of some point on the dotted curve. The part above point A is the
locus of points whose vector sum to the point A belongs to the dotted curve. The high valuation agent H (dashed indi¤erence
curve) is the agent whose MRS is higher for the output with respect to the input. The other agent is the low valuation agent
L (solid indi¤erence curve). The agents are required to report their utility functions and allocation is assigned according to
the serial cost sharing rule. An informationally e¢ cient way to implement the serial SCF as discussed in Moulin and Shenker
[19] is as follows. In the rst stage each agent reports a demand. One of the smallest demanders (call agent 1) demanding q1
(say) gets q1 and pays a cost share x1 calculated by equation (1) for the demand prole (q1; q1; :::; q1). This is equivalent to
agent 1 in gure 2 optimizing on the dash-dot curve. In the second stage, all the agents except agent 1, report their demands
(no smaller than q1). A smallest demander (call agent 2) demanding q2 (say) gets q2 and pays a cost share x2 given by the
equation (1) for the prole (q1; q2; q2; :::; q2). This is equivalent to agent 2 optimizing on the solid curve in gure 2. Similarly,
in the kth stage, all agents except agents 1 through k   1 report their demands (at least as much as qk 1) and the lowest
demander will be named as agent k, served his demand qk; and will be charged a cost share xk corresponding to the equation
(1) for the demand prole (q1; q2; :::; qk 1; qk; qk; :::; qk).
The purpose of bringing the 2 2 case of serial SCF here is that the generalized serial SCF is dened very closely in the
spirit of serial mechanism here. The three conditions below in the denition of generalized serial functions are linked to the
following three observation in the above picture.
1) The opportunity set of L remains una¤ected by changes in the preferences of H as long as H has higher valuation than
L.
2) Owing to the convexity of the production function and preferences, there is a unique maximizer point A for L on his
opportunity set given H and also B for H on her opportunity set given L.
3) Owing to no kinks in the solid curve and the dash-dot curve at point A, A remains the optimum point for L even after
small changes in preference by H.
Generalized serial mechanism (SCF):
The generalized serial SCF is dened for an economy with n agents and m goods where n and m are greater than 1.
Production technology P is described by a m   p dimensional smooth manifold that represents a technology where out of
m-goods, p are inputs and m-p are outputs. Set of alternatives A is the set of allocations to the agents in N which is feasible
under P. More formally, A  fx 2 Rmn+ j(
Pn
i=1 xi) 2 Pg. One example of such a set of alternatives where m = 2 and p = 1 is
the set of allocations for the two agents in the above example which add up to a point on the dotted curve in gure 2. In this
example, the production technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale where the input x can be interpreted as the cost of
the output q. The set of admissible utility functions Ui for agent i contains the functions ui : Rm+ ! R that are continuous,
non-decreasing in all dimensions, locally non satiated and quasi-concave. Linear utilities of agent i that constitute the subset
L of Ui will be considered isomorphic to Rm+   f0mg.
Denition 5 (Generalized Serial Function (Shenker) [23]) 12Consider a function a : Rn+ ! A s.t., 8z 2 Rn+ and
8 2 L :
(1) zi  zj ) ai(z) = ai(z j ; sj);8sj 2 [zi;1);
(2)  ai(z i; si) has a unique maximizer si; 8i;
(3)If si is the unique maximizer of   ai(z i; si) then si is also the unique maximizer of   ai(z0 i; si) 8z0 s.t., 8j 6= i;
MIN [z0j ; zj ] < si ) z0j = zj.
Such a function a is called a "generalized serial function."
The notation a  b means the inner product of the vectors a and b. The MIN function picks the minimum of the set.
The 3rd point of the dention above captures the notion that the optimum in a coordinate remains unchanged as long as the
bigger coordinates remain bigger. Lets denote by F the set of all generalized serial functions. For a given utility prole u
a function a 2 F induces the normal form game  (a;u)  hN; fSi = R+gi2N ; fui(ai()gi2N )i where N is the set of players,
R+ is the strategy space Si for each player i, and the payo¤ function for player i is given by ui  ai(). Such games possess a
unique NE.
Lemma 1 : 8u 2 U;8a 2 F;  (a;u) has a unique NE.13
Proof: The proof consists of two steps. In rst step it is shown that there can not be more than one NE and then an
explicit algorithm is given to construct an NE. A formal proof can be found in Appendix A.1 below.
12This function is similar to the one considered by Shenker but not exactly the same. The domain of the function a in Shenker is (0; 1) whereas
it R+ in our denition. This di¤erence, however, is not signicant.
13Notice that this lemma is same as the lemma 1 in Shenker [23] (up to a minor change in the domain of the function a as noted).
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Denition 6 (Generalized Serial Mechanism) a is a generalized serial mechanism (GSS) associated with a 2 F if
a(u) = a(z) where z is the unique NE of  (a;u).
5 Secure implementability of generalized serial mechanisms and the xed
path mechanisms
Now we are ready to present our main result, which encompasses the result of Saijo et al. [22]
Theorem 2 : Any generalized serial mechanism (GSS) is securely implementable.
Proof: We show the secure implementabilty of GSS by showing that the GSS are strategyproof and that they satisfy the
RP. Then by proposition 1 the desired result follows. Please refer to Appendix A.2 below for a complete proof.
Now we dene a class of social choice functions called xed path social choice functions based on xed path cost sharing
rules. Lets assume the conditions on the cost function and the preferences that were used in theorem 1. Then from Theorem
1 we know that there will be a unique NE in the game  (x; u) induced by the cost sharing rule x based on the xed path
.
Denition 7 A xed path social choice function x

associates the allocation corresponding to the unique NE of the game
 (x; u) to the preference prole u.
The following theorem states that all such xed path SCFs are securely implementable.
Theorem 3: Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, a xed path social choice function x

is a special case of the
generalized serial social choice function and thus is securely implementable.
Proof: The proof consists of explicitly constructing a generalized serial function a for every xed path social choice
function x

. We use two lemmas for proving the desired properties of such a. Please refer to Appendix A.3 below for a
comprehensive proof.
At this time we would like to emphasize that the SCFs corresponding to path methods other than xed path methods may
not be securely implementable. One such method as we discussed above is the Aumann-Shapley method, which corresponds
to the proportional method in the homogeneous goods case. To ensure the uniqueness of NE in the demand game, lets
consider linear utilities (which are obviously binormal) given by ui(qi; xi) = biqi   xi and convex cost technology given by
c(y) = y2=2. Proportional cost shares are given by xpri (q) =
qi
qN
c(qN ), where qN =
P
i2N qi: Lets dene the proportional
SCF x
pr
that associates to every utility prole u; the unique NE of the demand game  (xpr; u). We notice that this SCF
is not securely implementable. As a matter of fact it is not even strategyproof. To see this, consider a two-agent situation.
Let the linear utilities of agents 1 and 2 be dened by the parameters b1 and b2. Then, whenever bis are close enough to
ensure the active participation of both agents, the unique NE demand prole (q1 ; q

2) is given by q

i =
4
3 (bi   bj2 ) and the
equilibrium cost shares turn out to be xi = 49 (bi  bj2 )+ 23bj(bi  bj2 ), i; j 2 f1; 2g. Therefore, the optimal report bi of agent i
with true parameter bi is given by bi =
3
2bi+
5
4
bj where bj is the report of agent j. Clearly, there are protable manipulations
of reports by agents. In particular, suppose b1 = b2 = b and agent 1 reports truthfully, then the optimal report of agent 2 is
11
4 b.
We see that the FPMs are a special case of GSS. However, there are GSS that can not be represented by FPM. One
trivial example is a constant SCF. Therefore, we conclude that GSS are more general than FPMs and have nice strategic
properties.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the environments where even the strong notions of implementation like full implementation
in dominant strategy equilibria (DSE)or full implementation in Nash equilibria (NE)do not seem strong enough and the
evidence shows that a more robust concept is needed. Secure implementation(Saijo et al. [22]) requires the existence of a
mechanism that fully implements the SCF in NE and DSE. We show that a very broad class of SCFs is securely implementable
in production economies. This result encompasses the work by Saijo et al. [22] in that we nd much more general functions
applicable to much more general environments to be securely implementable.
An interesting and challenging question in this framework is to characterize the class of SCFs that are securely imple-
mentable. Although there are characterization results for specic environments like group strategy proof mechanisms for
binary goods (Juarez[10] ) or two-agent characterizations under unique Nash equilibrium of prot sharing game (Leroux
[14]), there is no such characterization for the general cost sharing mechanisms even under the classic concepts like imple-
mentation under DSE. Neither is there such a characterization of the general cost sharing problems under strategy proofness
or group strategy proofness. Given the stronger notion of secure implementation, we hope to get such a characterization. We
conjecture that every smooth, non-constant, anonymous and securely implementable SCF belongs the set of GSS.
6
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Step 1- Given any u 2 U and any a 2 F;  (a;u) can not have more than one NE.
Proof: Let z and z0 be two distinct NE with z = (z1; z2; z3; ::::; zn) and z0 = (z01; z
0
2; z
0
3; ::::; z
0
n) .
There must exist an element i such that zi 6= z0i and minfzj ; z0jg < minfzi; z0ig =) zj = z0j :
Without loss of generality, say z0i < zi: But then z
0
i = argmax
s2[0;1]
ui(ai(s; z i)) = zi which is a contradiction.
Step 2- Given any u 2 U and any a(z) 2 F; The following algorithm generates a prole z which is a (the) NE of  (a;u):
Algorithm:
1)Set z = (1; 1; ::::; 1).
2) Dene s1i = argmax
s2[0;1]
ui(ai(s; z i));8i:
3) Without loss of generality, let s11 = min
i
fs1i g: Set z1 = s11 and leave the other elements of z unchanged.
4) Dene s2i = argmax
s2[0;1]
ui(ai(s; z i));8i:
5)Without loss of generality, let s22 = min
i 6=1
fs1i g: Set z2 = s22 and leave the other elements of z unchanged.
6)Repeat the process to update z3; z4; :::::; zn.
Claim: The prole z obtained by the above algorithm is a NE of  (a;u):
Proof:
Claim 1. If sii  si+1i+1 for all i = 1; 2; :::n  1; then z is a NE.
Proof: Straightforward from condition 3 in Denition 5 and the way z has been constructed.
Claim 2. sii  si+1i+1 for all i = 1,2,...n-1.
Proof:
Part1- s11  s22: This holds because, s21 = s11 = z1 (because 1 is solving the same optimization exercise) and s22 < s11 =)
s22 = s
1
2 which contradicts the denition of s
1
1:
Part2- If sii  si+1i+1 for all i < k then skk  sk+1k+1 .
Proof: Notice rst that skl = zl = s
l
l for all l < k. This is true because of condition 3 in Denition 5. Now s
k+1
k+1 < s
k
k =)
sk+1k+1 = s
k
k+1 which contradicts the denition of s
k
k . 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Strategyproofness of GSS follows from Theorem 7.2.3 in Dasgupta et al. [4], given our domain of preferences being
monotonically closed and the fact that GSS is a single valued Nash implementable SCF.
We will prove the rectangularity property:
8u; ~u 2 U ; fui(a(~u)) = ui(a(ui; ~u i)) 8i 2 N =) a(~u) = a(u)g.
Proof:
Fix an arbitrary pair of utility proles u; ~u 2 U.
Let ui(
a(~u)) = ui(
a(ui; ~u i)) 8i 2 N .
Dene, NE( (a;ui; ~u i)) = ~zi; NE( (a; ~u)) = ~z ; NE( (a;u)) = z: (Notice the notation; ~zi is a vector and ~zi is the ith
component of the vector ~z. For example, ~zik is the kth component of ~z
i.)
Step 1: ~zi = ~z ; 8i 2 N .
Proof: Let ~zi 6= ~z for some i.
Now, we must have an element k s.t. ~zik 6= ~zk and minf~zij ; ~zjg < minf~zik; ~zkg =) ~zij = ~zj .
Case 1: k 6= i.
Without loss of generality, say, ~zik < ~zk:
~zik = argmax
s2[0;1]
~uk(ak(s; ~z
i
 k)) = argmax
s2[0;1]
~uk(ak(s; ~z k)) = ~zkwhich is a contradiction.
Case 2: k = i.
Here there are two relevant cases,
Case 2.1: ~zii < ~zi.
Then we have,
~zii = argmax
s2[0;1]
ui(ai(s; ~z
i
 i)) = argmax
s2[0;1]
ui(ai(s; ~z i))
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From property 1 in the denition of a, we must have the following.
ai(~z
i
i ; ~z
i
 i) = ai(~z
i
i ; ~z i)
or, ai(~zi) = ai(~zii ; ~z i)
Thus, ui(ai(~zi)) = ui(ai(~zii ; ~z i)).
We also know, ui(
a(~u)) = ui(
a(ui; ~u i)) 8i 2 N
or, ui(a(~z)) = ui(a(~zi)); 8i 2 N
or, ui(ai(~z)) = ui(ai(~zi)); 8i 2 N .
Therefore, ui(ai(~z)) = ui(ai(~zii ; ~z i)).
In other words, ui(ai(~zi; ~z i)) = ui(ai(~zii ; ~z i)).
But then, ~zii = ~zi because ~z
i
i is unique maximizer of ui(ai(s; ~z
i
 i)) and ui(ai(s; ~z i)).
Case 2.2: ~zii > ~zi.
From property 1 in the denition of a, we must have the following.
ai(~zi; ~z i) = ai(~zi; ~zi i)
or, ai(~z) = ai(~zi; ~zi i)
Thus, ui(ai(~z)) = ui(ai(~zi; ~zi i)).
We also know, ui(ai(~z)) = ui(ai(~zi)); 8i 2 N .
Therefore we have,
ui(ai(~z
i)) = ui(ai(~zi; ~z
i
 i)).
But then, ~zii = ~zi because ~z
i
i is unique maximizer of ui(ai(s; ~z
i
 i)) and ui(ai(s; ~z i)).

Notice, the above step establishes the following property :
~ui(ai(s; ~z i)) and ui(ai(s; ~z i)) both are maximized at ~zi = ~zii for all i.
Let us call this property property star.
Step 2: Claim: a(~u) = a(u).
Proof:
Proving a(z) = a(~z) should be enough since, by denition a(~u) = a(u) () a(z) = a(~z):
In fact, we will prove a stronger property, namely, z = ~z:
Suppose not and let z 6= ~z .
Now, we must have an element k s.t., zk 6= ~zk and minfzj ; ~zjg < minfzk; ~zkg =) zj = ~zj .
There can be two cases,
Case 1. zk > ~zk.
Then we get the following expression, where rst and fourth equalities are from denition, second follows from the property
star and third is due to the property 3 in the denition of function a.
~zk = argmax
s2[0;1]
~uk(ak(s; ~z k)) = argmax
s2[0;1]
uk(ak(s; ~z k)) = argmax
s2[0;1]
uk(ak(s; z k)) = zk and we reach a contradiction.
Case 2. zk < ~zk.
Then we get the following expression, where rst and fourth equalities are from denition, third follows from the property
star and second is due to the property 3 in the denition of function a.
zk = argmax
s2[0;1]
uk(ak(s; z k)) = argmax
s2[0;1]
uk(ak(s; ~z k)) = argmax
s2[0;1]
~uk(ak(s; ~z k)) = ~zk and we hit another contradiction
to conclude the proof.

A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
We rst present two lemmas which will be the key to the proof of Theorem 3 below.
Lemma 2 ( Lemma 1 in Friedman [5] ): Assume that marginal cost is strictly increasing in all variables and that xi
is a xed path method. Dene zi(qi) = min[tji(t)  qi]. Then:
(a) xi (q;C) is strictly increasing and strictly convex in qi:
(b) xi (q;C) is non decreasing in qj for all j 6= i.
(c) For all q and q0j such that both zj(qj) and zj(q
0
j)  zi(qi) then xi (q;C) = xi (q j ; q0j ;C).
Lemma 3 (Lemma 2 in Moulin & Shenker [19] ): Let h1(); h2() be two increasing and strictly convex functions
from R+ onto itself that coincide up to 0:
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h1() = h2() for all  2 [0 ; 0]
Then for every utility function ui in Ui, the (unique) maximizers of ui(hk(); ) on R+; denoted by k, k = 1; 2 are on
the same side of 0:
1 0 () 2 0; 1= 0 () 2= 0.
Proof of Theorem 3:
Fix a cost function C satisfying the assumptions of theorem 1. Let the domain of utility functions representing the
preferences satisfying the assumptions be U .
Let the the set of alternatives be A  f(q; x) : q 2 [0; qmax]N ; x 2 RN+ and
P
i2N xi = C(q)g. Consider a xed path  and
the associated xed path social choice function x

: U ! A which allocates the outcome corresponding to the unique NE of
 (x; u) to the preference prole u.
Consider Di = f0g [ ft 2 R+j 0i(t)  is positiveg14 and zi(qi) = min[tji(t)  qi] (see gure 1 above for such an
example of zi). We claim that a function a : i2NDi ! A which is dened as follows is a generalized serial function
and the associated generalized serial SCF a = x

. Let ai(z) = (qi(z); x

i (q(z))) for all i, where qi(z) = i(zi) and
q(z) = (1(z1); 2(z2); :::; n(zn)). We will now prove the three required properties (Denition 5) of a using Lemma 2 and
Lemma 3 above and the assumption on preferences.
First thing to notice is that even though the domain of a is not the same as in the original denition, the properties of a
is retained exactly. Now we will show the above three properties one by one. To see that property 1 is true, notice that zi
uniquely denes qi(z) = i(zi) which is independent of z i. Also, part (c) of the lemma 1 implies that x

i (q(z)) = x

i (q(z
0))
8z0 st., 8j 6= i; MIN [z0j ; zj ] < si ) z0j = zj . Property 2 is a consequence of part (a) of lemma 1 and the linearity of
preferences. We rst notice that strict convexity of xi (q;C) in qi and linearity of preferences which are increasing in qi
and decreasing in xi ensures a unique maximizer qi . But then, there will a unique z

i for this q

i by the denition of zi.
Property 3 is a bit more subtle and the proof is as follows. Consider two points z and z0 in i2NDi. Consider a coordinate
i. Let, 8j 6= i; MIN [z0j ; zj ] < si ) z0j = zj . Consider  2 fR+  R g n f(0; 0)g. Let si = argmax
si2Di
:ai(z i; si) and
~si = argmax
si2Di
:ai(z
0
 i; si). Lets call faj(z i; si)gj2N = f(qj ; xj)gj2N and faj(z0 i; ~si)gj2N = f(~qj ; ~xj)gj2N . From part
(c) of lemma 2 we know xi (q i; qi;C) = x

i (~q i; qi;C) for all qi 2 [0; qi]. Also, we know from part (b) of lemma 2 that
xi (q i; ;C) and xi (~q i; ;C) both are strictly convex in qi. By the denition of si it follows that qi = argmax
qi2[0;qmax]
  (qi ,
xi (q i; qi;C)). But then from lemma 3 we must have qi = ~qi. Finally to conclude the proof we notice that qi being a one to
one function of zi implies that si = ~si. Also, because of the way we have dened 
a and x

they coincide.

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Highlights
• We show the possibility of Secure Implementation in a very general 
environment. 
• Generalized Serial SCFs are shown to be Securely Implementable.
• These mechanisms include the well-known Fixed Path Methods as a special 
case.
